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8intelligence agencies as “Shah Rukh,” 
Yasin was identified as a terrorist 
following the September 13, 2008 blasts 
in New Delhi that killed 30 people.19 
Yasin and Mohsin Chaudhary are close 
aides of Riyaz Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal, 
two senior IM operatives believed to be 
operating from Dubai and Karachi.20 
Continued Threats to India
As details emerge about the Karachi 
Project, it is clear that militants inside 
Pakistan are posing an ongoing threat 
to India. Both Khwaja and Salman 
reportedly told their interrogators that 
IM operatives in Karachi were under 
pressure from the ISI-LT leadership 
to organize fresh terrorist attacks 
in India.21 Like Khwaja, Salman was 
instructed to reactivate dormant IM 
cells in India.22 As stated by an Indian 
intelligence official, the IM has become 
a potential resource base that the “LT 
hopes to use right from identification 
and reconnaissance of targets to 
arranging logistics for terror attacks.”23 
Shortly after the Pune attack, the 
Mumbai police’s Anti-Terrorism 
Squad (ATS) foiled another major LT-
IM plot in March by arresting Abdul 
Latif and Riyaz Ali, who were allegedly 
planning to attack the headquarters of 
the Indian oil major ONGC, along with 
the bustling Mangaldas Market and 
Borivali’s Thakkar Mall in Mumbai.24 
The subsequent probe revealed a 
“strategy” and “recruitment” pattern 
Suspect in Pune Blast,” Telegraph [Kolkata], April 9, 
2010.
19  “Hunt Begins for Mohsin, Missing IM Recruiter.” For 
details on the September 13, 2008 New Delhi blasts, see 
Rahul Tripathi, “Serial Blasts Rock Delhi; 30 Dead, 90 
Injured,” Times of India, September 14, 2008.
20 “ISI Colonel Takes Care of Karachi Logistics.”
21 “Terror Alert Sounded in Mumbai, Bangalore and 
Kolkata.”
22  Ibid.
23  “IM has ‘Hostels’ in Gulf, Nepal & Bangladesh Too,” 
Economic Times, March 11, 2010.
24  According to the Anti-Terrorist Squad of the Mum-
bai police, the accused were in touch with one Karachi-
based “Uncle,” identified as Khan Abdul Bashir Ainul 
Haq Khan, a fugitive himself accused of involvement in 
the 1993 Mumbai serial bomb blasts case. This “Uncle” 
reportedly directed the two men to recruit Indian youth 
and arrange them to be sent to Pakistan for training and 
to carry out terrorist attacks in India. For details, see 
“Two Held for Planning Attacks in Mumbai,” Financial 
Express, March 15, 2010; “Court Extends Custody of Sus-
pects in ONGC Fire Plot,” Indian Express, April 14, 2010.
quite consistent with the Karachi 
Project.25 Even though the ONGC and 
German Bakery plots are different, and 
perhaps schemed by separate terror 
modules, authorities believe that the 
ONGC conspiracy was also hatched in 
Karachi.26
Despite pressure from the United States, 
it does not appear that elements within 
Pakistan’s government will completely 
crack down on the activities of the LT. 
Pakistan is already suffering from its 
own jihadist violence from various 
Pakistani Taliban groups, and it risks 
making more domestic enemies by 
turning against militant cadres focused 
on the country’s rival, India.27 As a 
result, it appears only a matter of time 
before the LT and IM execute another 
attack on the Indian homeland.
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on march 4, 2010, naval authorities 
issued a threat advisory of a potential 
terrorist plot targeting shipping 
interests transiting the Malacca Strait. 
Malaysia’s navy chief, Admiral Abdul 
Aziz Jaafar, warned that “terrorists 
are targeting specific tankers in the 
Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait.”1 
Singapore’s home affairs minister, 
Wong Kan Seng, said, “We received 
intelligence from our liaison partners 
about this possible plot to go and attack 
vessels coming through Singapore 
waters through the Strait of Malacca.”2 
The warning came on the heels of the 
arrests of 14 suspected terrorists at an 
alleged Jemaah Islamiya (JI) training 
camp on Indonesia’s Sumatra Island, 
which forms the eastern boundary of the 
waterway.3 The incident has heightened 
regional and international concerns that 
the Malacca Strait could become a focus 
of Islamist maritime terrorism.4
In light of these recent threats, this 
article examines the likelihood of sea-
based extremist violence in the region, 
JI’s capacity to operate in an offshore 
environment, and whether Southeast 
Asia is a place that al-Qa`ida would seek 
to exploit in terms of maritime attacks. It 
finds that the risk of a decisive maritime 
strike in the Malacca Strait is low, 
especially in the context of disrupting 
shipping interests as part of an economic 
war against the West.
1 Alex Kennedy, “Tankers Warned of Terror Threat in 
Malacca Strait,” Associated Press, March 4, 2010.
2 “Singapore Raises Security Alert Levels After Malacca 
Strait Threat,” Reuters, March 5, 2010.
3 Ibid.; “14 Suspects Charged Under Indonesia’s Anti-
Terror Laws,” ChannelNewsAsia.com, March 4, 2010.
4  The Joint War Council of the Lloyds Market Associa-
tion designated the Malacca Strait an area of Perceived 
Enhanced Risk in July 2005. For details, see Peter Chalk, 
The Maritime Dimension of International Security (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), p. 33; Martin Murphy, Small 
Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), pp. 83-84; Graham Gerard Ong-
Webb, “Introduction: Southeast Asian Piracy: Research 
and Developments,” in Graham Gerard Ong-Webb ed., 
Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p. xxxiv.
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9Maritime Terrorism: The Jihadist Call to Arms
In May 2009, al-Qa`ida issued a global 
communiqué exhorting jihadists around 
the world to attack strategic maritime 
chokepoints as part of a wider economic 
war against the West.5 On the surface, 
this call to arms seems to have direct 
relevance to the Malacca Strait. This 
particular maritime passage is one of the 
most important and busiest in the world, 
seeing an average of 50,000 transits a 
year that account for around a third of 
the world’s trade and oil shipments as 
well as much of its liquefied natural gas 
(LNG).6 The Malacca Strait is also highly 
prone to congestion and bottlenecks, 
measuring just over 1.5 miles wide at 
the narrowest point.7
While there is little doubt concerning 
the economic salience of the Malacca 
Strait, carrying out decisive attacks 
against ships transiting through this 
corridor is somewhat more challenging 
than commonly portrayed. One of the 
most frequently postulated scenarios is 
that terrorists could attempt to disrupt 
the commercial viability of the Strait, 
either by detonating a hijacked oil or 
LNG tanker to shut down a prominent 
commercial terminal (such as the Port of 
Singapore) or by scuttling a large ship to 
block the through-passage of maritime 
traffic.8 Although theoretically possible, 
realization of both attack contingencies 
would be difficult to achieve. 
Igniting pressurized LNG or oil is 
technically problematic. Unless these 
substances vent in their liquid form 
and mix with air in the correct ratio, 
the probability of either substance fully 
5  “Maritime Terrorism in the Eyes of Al-Qaeda,” In-
ternational Institute for Counter-Terrorism, November 
2009. The communiqué was posted in Jihad Press, an 
electronic newspaper.
6 “Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Choke-
points,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Janu-
ary 2008; “Singapore Warns of Threat to Tankers in 
Malacca Strait,” BBC, March 4, 2010.
7 Ibid.; Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global 
Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p. 38; “Ships 
Collide Off Malaysia Coast,” al-Jazira, August 19, 2009. 
8  See, for instance, Richardson, pp. 38-45; Mansoor Ijaz, 
“The Maritime Threat from al-Qaeda,” Financial Times, 
October 19, 2003; Jerry Frank, “Big Business Gets Politi-
cal Over Rising Global Risks,” Lloyds List, January 24, 
2008; Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 
p. 266; “Security Raised in Malacca Strait After Terror 
Warning.”
catching fire is extremely low. Even if 
this did occur, the lateral force of any 
subsequent explosion would likely be 
contained by the tanker’s hull, which 
would force the destructive energy 
upwards rather than outwards (thus 
minimizing its destructive potential).9 
Sinking a major oceangoing freighter 
is equally as challenging and would, at 
a minimum, require the perpetrating 
group to have ready access to a large 
quantity of explosives, the time and 
means to transport this material and 
the expertise to know where to place 
the bombs to cause a critical breach. 
These logistical and knowledge barriers 
would pose formidable barriers for a 
single attack—much less an assault that 
targeted two or three ships (which would 
be required to truly block the Strait).10
An external ramming strike using a fast 
inshore attack craft (FIAC) arguably 
represents a more realistic scenario and 
is certainly one that has been used in 
the past. Leveraging these vessels as an 
attack platform offers the advantages 
of money, deftness and surprise in 
that FIACs are cheap, easy to handle 
and anonymous enough to mingle 
with other maritime traffic.11 Even an 
FIAC-mounted attack, however, has 
a questionable prospect of causing a 
critical breach. Indeed, as the suicide 
bombings against the USS Cole in 2000 
and the MV Limburg in 2002 highlighted, 
if the site of the impact does not accord 
with weak points in the ship’s skeletal 
design, it is unlikely that catastrophic 
damage would result.12
9  Martin Murphy, “Maritime Terrorism: The Threat in 
Context,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2006, p. 21; 
“Facts About LNG,” Sound Energy Solutions, available 
online at www.soundenergysolutions.com.
10  Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Secu-
rity, pp. 12, 23; Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, 
“Smooth Sailing: The World’s Shipping Lanes Are Safe,” 
Foreign Affairs 86:3 (2007). It should also be noted that 
the Malacca Strait is not a truly non-substitutable water-
way. Blocking the passageway would require, at most, 
only an extra two to three days steaming time which 
would not unduly impact the overall cost and transport 
of global freight.
11  Murphy, “Maritime Terrorism: The Threat in Con-
text,” p. 23.
12  Rupert Herbert-Burns, “Terrorism in the Early 21st 
Century Maritime Domain,” in Joshua Ho and Catherine 
Zara Raymond eds., The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: 
Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2005), pp. 164-165.
By far the most vulnerable vessel to 
terrorist aggression is a passenger 
ferry since its very purpose—to move 
large numbers of people as quickly 
and efficiently as possible—necessarily 
precludes the option for concerted (and 
some might argue even basic) security. 
Moreover, these ships generally sail 
at or above full capacity and are often 
characterized by certain design features 
(notably light flammable “outer-skins,” 
thin hulls and open car decks that 
lack stabilizing bulkheads) that make 
them highly susceptible to flooding 
and sinking.13 Nevertheless, ferries 
only constitute a small percentage of 
the maritime traffic that transits the 
Malacca Strait, they are generally not 
sizeable vessels (meaning that sinking 
them would be unlikely to cause a major 
blockage along the Strait) and their value 
as a strategic economic target, at least in 
this particular vicinity, is limited.14
JI and Maritime Attacks
Al-Qa`ida’s May 2009 communiqué 
also had relevance to JI on account of 
the group’s past links to the al-Qa`ida 
transnational network. These ties, 
however, have mostly atrophied during 
the last five years, and while JI was 
certainly prepared to accept Usama bin 
Ladin’s past financial and operational 
support, the group always tended 
to prioritize its own local objectives 
over that of its erstwhile backer. 
Since the mid-2000s, this agenda has 
essentially centered on reconsolidating 
and building strength in Indonesia by 
returning the movement to its historical 
Darul Islam roots.15 Executing attacks 
in the Malacca Strait at the behest of 
13  For more on the vulnerability of ferries to terrorist at-
tacks, see Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International 
Security, p. XX; Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry 
Willis, Ivan Khilko and David Ortiz, Maritime Terrorism. 
Risk and Liability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).
14  Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of 
attacks against ferries in other parts of Southeast Asia 
where they are far more common and critical to the day-
to-day lives of many ordinary citizens. The Philippines, 
for instance, has seen several attacks on these vessels, 
including the 2004 bombing of SuperFerry 14, which left 
116 people dead.
15  Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau and 
Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast 
Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 
p. 102. The basic aim of Darul Islam was to overthrow 
the secular Indonesian state that emerged in the wake of 
independence from the Netherlands and replace it with 
one based on the full observance of Shari`a law.
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an organization based on the other side 
of the world would have little, if any, 
relevance to this strategic priority.
 
Just as importantly, JI has no 
maritime tradition, and apart from 
unsubstantiated allegations has never 
sought to extend its operational realm 
beyond a territorial environment. 
The group is not known to have any 
mariner human or technical skill sets 
at its disposal, and given its current 
weakened and disaggregated state 
would be unlikely to invest the limited 
resources it has in trying to develop 
an entirely new (and in many respects 
unproven) attack profile.16
Moreover, JI’s center of gravity lies 
in Indonesia’s Java, which is by no 
means contiguous to the Malacca Strait. 
Although commentators have claimed 
that the militants recently arrested 
in Indonesia’s northern Sumatra 
were attending a JI training camp, no 
evidence has yet to surface that this was 
the case or, indeed, that those detained 
were Islamist terrorists seeking to 
target ships transiting the seaway.17 
The fact that Achenese Muslims, 
including former insurgents associated 
with Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, have 
historically (and strongly) shunned 
attempts by JI to gain a foothold in the 
region also clouds the veracity of these 
claims.18
The Malacca Strait an Unlikely Target
The Malacca Strait constitutes an 
important maritime corridor that 
presumably accords well with al-
16  See, for instance, Stefan Eklof Amirell, “Political Pi-
racy and Maritime Terrorism,” in Graham Gerard Ong-
Webb, Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Mal-
acca Straits (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), pp. 58-59.
17  Personal interviews, maritime security analysts, Co-
penhagen, Denmark, March 2010. Thus far, no evidence 
has surfaced that those arrested in northern Sumatra 
were connected to either JI’s mainstream or its so-called 
“pro-bombing bloc.” As noted in the text, JI has consis-
tently failed to gain a footprint in this particular region. 
Moreover, most of the materiel seized in the purported 
camp—rifles, military uniforms, propaganda leaflets and 
videos of the 2002 Bali suicide bombings—strongly sug-
gest preparations for a land-based attack as opposed to 
one aimed against maritime conveyance.
18  See, for instance, Leonard Sebastian, “The Indone-
sian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror 
Without Becoming a National Security State,” in Kumar 
Ramakrishna ed., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2004).
Qa`ida’s purported aim to disrupt 
Western shipping interests. For two 
basic, inter-related reasons, however, 
the group would probably seek to 
realize this objective elsewhere. First, 
the Malacca Strait is well guarded. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
are all fully committed to ensuring the 
safety of the waterway through the 
exchange of intelligence and the regular 
conduct of joint patrols and exercises.19 
Since 2005, a limited but growing 
regime of wider airborne surveillance 
has also been in place. Known as the 
“Eye in the Sky,” the initiative includes 
the three littoral states in addition 
to Thailand and the Philippines.20 
Under the scheme, each participating 
country has made available two planes 
and commits to flying two sorties a 
week over the Strait—meaning that for 
every seven days there are at least 16 
hours of continual coverage over the 
waterway.21 
Second, there are other strategic 
chokepoints that offer a more conducive 
operational theater. Notable in this 
regard is the Gulf of Aden. Not only 
does this passage serve as a vital and 
largely non-substitutable22 trade and 
energy link between the Indian Ocean 
and Europe, it also abuts Somalia—a 
state that has not seen a functioning 
system of governance since 1991. 
Moreover, there are at least two groups 
in this region that are well placed to hit 
19  The effectiveness of these measures has been reflected 
in the dramatic drop of piracy incidents reported in the 
Malacca Strait. According to statistics from the Inter-
national Maritime Bureau (IMB), attacks have declined 
by roughly 83% during the past four years. See “Armed 
Robbery and Piracy Against Ships: Annual Report, 
2009,” International Maritime Bureau, 2010, p. 5.
20  The three littoral states are Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore.
21  Personal interview, maritime security specialists at-
tending the “Comprehensive Responses to Terrorism 
Conference,” Cambodia, August 2009. Also see Ong-
Webb, “Introduction,” pp. xxix-xxxi; Mohd Nasir Yu-
soff, “Eye-in-the-Sky-Initiative Over Malacca Straits 
from September 13,” Bernama, September 8, 2005.
22  In this respect, the Gulf of Aden offers a more at-
tractive operational theater for carrying out terrorist at-
tacks designed to disrupt the mechanics of global trade. 
If ships were precluded from transiting the waterway, 
they would be forced to re-route around the Cape of 
Good Hope in South Africa. This would add at least three 
weeks to an average journey, resulting in increased ship-
ping costs of between $1.5 and $2 million to cover extra 
fuel, labor and time. 
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maritime targets, both of which have 
stated their full allegiance to the Islamist 
enterprise: al-Shabab, which in 2010 for 
the first time announced its solidarity 
with Bin Ladin and readiness to stage 
attacks off the Horn of Africa in pursuit 
of his ideological and militant agenda;23 
and al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), which in 2009 declared a 
“mast media” campaign urging Muslims 
to gather all relevant information on 
American vessels sailing near Yemen, 
including data on payloads, crews and 
how they are serviced by other states.24 
Conclusion
Although the Malacca Strait represents 
a key maritime corridor and has been 
the focus of a number of postulated risk 
scenarios, the threat of a major terrorist 
strike appears low. The waterway is 
well guarded and there is currently no 
group in the immediate region with the 
necessary skills or motivation to conduct 
decisive operations against maritime 
assets. The most likely entity to attempt 
an attack would be al-Qa`ida, with the 
principal objective being to realize the 
movement’s self-defined economic jihad 
against the West. Nevertheless, there 
is no evidence that the organization 
is presently working with affiliates 
in Southeast Asia to further this goal. 
Moreover, there are other theaters that 
offer a far more conducive environment 
for targeting sea-based commercial and 
energy assets that have critical relevance 
to the functioning of the contemporary 
global order.
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23  Huma Yusuf, “Somali Militant Group Al Shabab 
Aligns with Al-Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, Febru-
ary 10, 2010.
24  “Q&A: Yemen’s al-Qaeda Wing Gains Global Notori-
ety,” Reuters, January 13, 2010; Bill Gertz, “Navy Warns 
Ships About Al Qaeda Risk Near Yemen,” Washington 
Times, March 23, 2010.
